

of work and dedication to enhance, preserve, and share this prehistoric treasure with the community and future generations.

In addition to the Johnsons, I recognize Suzanne Allen; Dr. Andrew Barnum; Herb Basso; Dr. David Borris; Alan Crooks; Lyle Drake; Kenneth Hinton; Sharon Isom; unfortunately, now deceased; LaRee Jones; Dr. James Kirkland; Dr. Martin Lockley; Dan Matheson; the late Layton Ott; Kathy Smith; Darcy Stewart; Marshall Topham; Gary Watts; John Willie. They are all members of the DinosaurAh!torium, a 501 (c) 3 foundation responsible for funding the project. Advisory members include James Hansen, Dr. Jerry Harris, Gary Sanders, with Cliff Green and Robert Milner, resident artist. I also thank Paul Jensen and Jeff Chapman for allowing access to their properties for the collection, preservation, and storage of fossils.

Finally, today, I specifically want to recognize and thank the many volunteers who have made and are making the Dinosaur Discovery Site at Johnson Farm possible. Many of these wonderful individuals have been contributing their time and energy for more than 5 years. A tremendous thank you to the Dinosaur Discovery Site at Johnson Farm volunteers. I commend each of them.

Mr. President, 2000 volunteers include Chad Anderson; T.R. Thompson; Andrew Milner; Donnette Hatch; June Barton; Rae Crabtree; Nina Schwarze; Karen Rammell; Lee Rammell; Doug Bergen; Richard Gardner; Ryan Babcock; Dick Groves; Robert Pritchitt; Klein Adams; Rafael Acosta; Ryan Oburn; Hal Arrowood; Jason Skeen; Clyde Terry; Vilma Terry; Bev Middleton; Chris Walker; Steve Smith; Helen Salvatore; Cindy Greco; Scott Broen; Jereen Hyde; Stevan Duke; Barbara Duke; Stacie Wilson; Constance Sherwood; Jacob Hendriks; Josephine Kellejan; Ruth Rote; John Rote; Dustin Rooks; and Brett Bronson.

Mr. President, 2001 volunteers: Jim Burns; Barbara Hatch; Peggy Wardle; Carol Duley; Gary Watts; Ember Rodgers; Kirk Rehfield; Bill Reynolds; Theresa Walker; Cassandra Lee; Lynnie Rolfe; Joel Campbell; Ryan Losee; Chris Gibson; Kyle Fraley; John Shaw; Steve Anderson; Drew Gubler; Shelton Heath; Paula Ryan; Bernie Yeager; Jill Conner; Candace Crane; Nichole Burton; Austin Carter; Dusty Ott; Kirk Richfield; Nate Leifson; Ron Kittelsrud; Maren Christensen; Ben Joe Markland; Emily Weidauer; Holly Hult; Carol Killian; Scott Woodworth; Brian Barrett; Warren Hoskings; Kevin Wiederhold; Autumn Cluff; and Lynn White.

Mr. President, 2002 volunteers: Rudy Johnson; Clay Hopkins; Jeff Lingwall; Debbie Woodard; Joyce Proctor; Britton Puki; Joe Borden; Melvin Done; Melanie Hackmann; Kathryn VanRoosendaal; Doug Griffiths; Charlotte Rice; Angie Hendrickson; Chad

Tipton; Laurie Barnholt; Aaron Heaton; Kathy Hancock; Carson Blickenstaff; Glen Steenbuck; Bev Rhodes; Brigham Mellor; Kami Cox; Kathy Cox; Russ Childs; Delbert Vern Chadwick; Beverly Kirk; Matthew Wilkinson; Monte Johnson; Darrell Wade; Terri Wade; Sheena Gawer; Barbara Smith; Ken Parkes; Darienne McNamara; Kat Duttadway; Kylea Christensen; Jacob Cox; Jason Rabbitt; Don Triptow; Bill Yensen; Arlene Yensen; Les Townsend; Barbara Townsend; Al Abrams; John Donnell; JoAnn Abrams; Arlea Howell; David Kitselmer; Steve Chilow; Cathy Freeman; Duane Freeman; Steven Bart; Elizabeth Nipperus; Misti Rooks; Kathleen Milner; Robert Milner; Shirley White; Robert White; and Guy Pace.

Mr. President, 2003 volunteers: Janece Tolber; George D'Apuzzo; Carl Berg; Laurie Berg; Myron Hatch; David Slauf; Taylor Birthisel; Linda Baldazzi; Bob Baldazzi; Sally Stephenson; Steve Stephenson; Roger Head; Bonnie Head; Jacqueline Dubois; Jerry Schwantz; Shirley Surfas; Pat Vanderwark; Keith Vanderwark; Joan Triptow; Jay Guymon; Kolby Andersen; Kelly Bringham; Marc Raines; Lisa Raines; Molly Swift; Chester Pierce; Dennis Broad; George Muller; Rena Jensen; Roger Taylor; Maynie Begeman; Robert Begeman; Val Humble; Paul Wiener; Frances Wiener; Anne Bredon; Gail Taylor; Mike Llewellyn; Curtis Halliday; Dale Peck; Arlea Howell; Shannon Ducrest; Anne Basham; Brooke Ranter; Melissa Thomson; Michelle Bower; Jana Hightower; Brian Schlegel; Danny Diamond; Dallas Jones; Andrew Neff; Lindsay Connelley-Brown; and Linda Hoernke.

Mr. President, 2004 volunteers: Carla Ritter; Sheila Hughes; Don Hughes; Tracey O'Kelly; Jessica Williams; and Lillian Zielke.

Mr. President, 2005 volunteers: Paula Welker; Connie Welker; Kameron Evans; Dick Vos; Roberta Champlin; Wally Champlin; Richard Berger; Justin Moosman; Christine Blum; Lamont Reynolds; Judy D'Apuzzo; Louise Snyder; Arleen Stillman; Lorene Reynolds; Freddie Arrighi; Shelly Robinson; Sarah Spears; Judy Warren; and Janice Evans.

To these dedicated volunteers and to all of those who will continue to volunteer, I say thank you.

NURSING RELIEF FOR DISADVANTAGED AREAS REAUTHORIZATION ACT

Mr. CORNYN. Mr. President, I would like to go on the record regarding H.R. 1285, the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Reauthorization Act of 2005, a bill that I support as it moves through the Senate today.

This legislation extends for 3 years the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999 which provides non-immigrant visas for nurses in areas where there is a shortage of health professionals.

Many hospitals across the Nation and, particularly in my home State of Texas, have been experiencing great difficulties over the last several years in attracting nurses. This shortage has been especially severe in both inner-city neighborhoods and in rural isolated areas.

It was for this reason that in 1999 Congress passed the Nursing Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act. This legislation created a new H-1C temporary worker program with 500 visas available per year for registered nurses. In order to be eligible to petition for an alien nurse, a hospital must be located in a health professional shortage area as designated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the hospital must have at least 190 acute care beds, and it must have a certain percentage of Medicare and Medicaid patients.

The legislation also included strong protections for American nurses by requiring that any H-1C nurses be paid the prevailing wage and mandating that hospitals take steps to recruit American nurses. Furthermore H-1C nurses may not comprise more than 33 percent of a hospital's registered nurses, and these hospitals may not contract out any H-1C nurses to other hospitals.

The legislation before us, H.R. 1285, will reauthorize the H-1C nurse program for 3 more years. The H-1C visa category is vital to Texas hospitals like McAllen Medical Center and Mercy Health System, located in Laredo, TX. The United States is facing a critical nursing shortage in the coming years, and this small but significant program is essential to our efforts to recruit more nurses to the United States. I believe this legislation strikes a balance between the critical need for nurses in certain shortage areas while protecting the wages and working conditions of U.S. citizen nurses.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill.

TESTIMONY OF MALLORY FACTOR

Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following testimony given by Mr. Mallory Factor before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on September 29, 2004, and before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on June 15, 2004, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF MALLORY FACTOR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES SENATE, SEPTEMBER 29, 2004

Chairman Shelby, Senator Sarbanes, and Distinguished Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about my views on the critical issue of curbing terror financing.

Chairman Shelby, I would like to commend you in particular for your unwavering commitment to addressing the financing of terror. The work that this Committee is undertaking is extremely important to the United

States and the world. Thank you for your leadership.

My testimony will focus on terror financing emanating from within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Clearly, there are numerous other states that allow terror financing to continue and that should be examined also. I have chosen to focus on Saudi Arabia because of the enormous resources that are funneled from within Saudi Arabia to terrorist groups around the world.

My recommendations are contained in a report of an Independent Task Force on Terrorist Financing, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, on which I served as Vice-Chair. Since the report, along with its various appendices, is almost 300 pages in length, I will only be able to highlight core points and ask that the full report and its appendices be placed into the record.

I would like to thank the Task Force Chairman, Maurice R. Greenberg, who has been a leader in bringing this issue to the nation's attention. I would also like to thank Council President Richard Haass for his commitment to this topic and to the Task Force's mission. I am testifying in my personal capacity, as is customary, and not on behalf of the Task Force or the Council on Foreign Relations.

Among the core findings of the first Terrorist Financing Task Force report, released in October 2002, was that "For years, individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for al-Qaeda; and for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem."

It should be noted that the Task Force found no evidence that the Saudi government—as an institution—participated in the financing of terror directly. However, the Saudi government has clearly allowed individual and institutional financiers of terror to operate and prosper within Saudi borders.

The Bush administration has accomplished a great deal since 9/11. Some of the Administration's achievements in this area have been integrating terrorist financing into the U.S. government's overall counterterrorism effort, securing unprecedented international support for UN sanctions against al-Qaeda, strengthening international standards for financial supervision through the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), issuing significant and meaningful regulations under the Patriot Act and implementing a wide-ranging strategy to engage Saudi Arabia on the subject of financial and ideological support of extremists. Still, there is much work to be done.

I would like to set forth the following framework of constructive, forward looking recommendations for improving U.S. efforts against terrorism financing.

First, U.S. policymakers must build a new framework for U.S.-Saudi relations. The terror financing issue is situated in the complex and important bilateral relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. For decades, U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have been built upon a consistent framework understood by both sides: Saudi Arabia would be a constructive actor with regard to the world's oil markets and regional security issues, and the United States would help provide for the defense of Saudi Arabia, work to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and not raise any significant questions about Saudi Arabian domestic issues, either publicly or privately.

More recently however, this framework has come under strain because al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization rooted in issues central to Saudi Arabian domestic affairs, has murdered thousands of Americans. Al-Qaeda and similar organizations continue to conspire to kill even more Americans and to threaten our way of life.

Changed circumstances require a new policy framework for U.S.-Saudi relations. When domestic Saudi issues threaten Americans at home and abroad, the U.S. must pay attention to those Saudi "domestic" issues that impact U.S. security such as terrorist financing and the global export of Islamic extremism. These issues can no longer be "off the table"; they must be front and center in our bilateral relationship.

This transition is already well underway, as evidenced by turbulence in the bilateral relationship since 9/11. Some Bush administration officials have privately characterized the current state of affairs in Saudi Arabia as a "civil war" and suggested that the appropriate objective for U.S. policy in this context is to help the current regime prevail. I agree, but believe the domestic Saudi problem will not be solved by dispersing al-Qaeda cells and members in Saudi Arabia alone. Rather, the "civil war" will be won only when the regime confronts directly and unequivocally addresses the ideological, religious, social, and cultural realities that fuel al-Qaeda, its imitators, and its financiers all over the world.

Second, Saudi Arabia must fully implement its new laws and regulations and take additional steps to further improve its efforts to combat terrorist financing. In addition to implementing its recently enacted laws and regulations in this area, Saudi Arabia should also deter the financing of terrorism by publicly punishing those Saudi individuals and organizations that have funded terrorist organizations. Although a recent report by FATF noted several prosecutions in Saudi Arabia under the terror financing laws, arrests and punitive steps against financiers of terror have only taken place in the "shadows". I am not aware of any publicly announced arrests, trials or incarcerations in Saudi Arabia relating to the financing of terrorism. Saudi Arabia must also increase the financial transparency and programmatic verification of its global charities and publicly release audit reports of those charities. Saudi Arabia should ratify and implement treaties that create binding international legal obligations relating to combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

Third, multilateral initiatives need to be better coordinated, appropriately funded, and invested with clear punitive authorities. The need for a new international organization specializing in terrorist financing issues, as recommended by the Task Force's initial report, has diminished as a result of significant efforts being undertaken by a variety of international actors. The need for proper coordination and clearer mandates has increased for the same reason. It is now time to minimize duplicative efforts and re-allocate resources to the most effective and appropriate lead organization.

Fourth, the executive branch should formalize its efforts to centralize the coordination of U.S. measures to combat terrorist financing. My understanding is that, in practice, responsibilities for the coordination of terrorist financing issues have shifted from the Treasury Department to the White House. I commend the Bush Administration for this action. However, setting up a formal allocation of responsibilities is crucial to maintain continuity and focus as the specific individuals involved in these efforts turn over. Therefore, allocation of responsibility to the White House needs to be formalized through a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) or otherwise.

Fifth, Congress should enact a Treasury-led certification regime specifically on terrorist financing. Many governments are working on shutting down terror financing from within their borders, but many are not.

Congress should adopt a certification regime under which the Treasury Department provides a written certification on an annual basis (classified if necessary) detailing the steps that foreign nations have taken to cooperate in U.S. and international efforts to combat terror financing. In the absence of a presidential national security waiver, jurisdictions that do not receive this certification would be subject to sanctions provided by section 311 of the Patriot Act—including denial of U.S. foreign assistance monies and limitations on access to the U.S. financial system.

The Administration has used the powers granted to it by section 311 of the Patriot Act but only once in the terror financing context. Section 311 allows Treasury to require domestic financial institutions and agencies to take "special measures" against certain parties, including both institutions and jurisdictions, believed by the Treasury to be engaged in money laundering/terror financing. These special measures can include placing prohibitions or conditions on "correspondent" or "payable through" accounts involving the parties engaged in the money laundering/terror financing.

Of course, foreign financial institutions and jurisdictions that do not have significant financial relations with the United States would not be meaningfully impacted by Section 311 sanctions imposed by the United States. However, a similar sanction imposed in the money laundering context resulted in the targeted jurisdiction promulgating desired legislative and regulatory changes.

A certification regime for terror financing would ensure that these special measures are used appropriately and thoughtfully against "rogue" jurisdictions. A separate certification regime for terror financing—distinct from any other reporting requirements on the promulgation of terror itself or money laundering—ensures that stringent requirements are maintained specifically with respect to each jurisdiction's practices on terror financing without consideration of other issues.

I commend Congresswoman Sue Kelly and others who have introduced legislation in the House, as H.R. 5124, that would require a terror financing certification regime.

Sixth, the UN Security Council should broaden the scope of the UN's al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. The UN Security Council should specifically impose international sanctions on other groups and individuals that have been designated as terrorists, as Hamas has been by the United States and E.U. I understand that these UN committees continue to discuss various actions but have not taken any affirmative action as yet. Furthermore, the UN should require, as a matter of international law, that member states take enforcement action against groups, persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee. The enabling resolution for these expanded authorities should explicitly reject the notion that acts of terror may be legitimized by the charitable activities or political motivations of the perpetrator. The UN should make it clear that no cause, however legitimate, justifies the use of terror.

Seventh, the U.S. government should increase sharing of information with the financial services sector as permitted by Section 314(a) of the PATRIOT Act so that this sector can cooperate more effectively with the U.S. government in identifying financiers of terror. Helping private sector financial institutions become effective partners in identifying financiers of terror should be a top priority. The procedures set forth in Section 314(a) of the PATRIOT Act, which promote

information sharing between the U.S. government and financial institutions to increase detection of terror financing, are not working as well as they should. The U.S. government is still not providing financial institutions with adequate information to enable the institutions to detect terror financing and identify unknown perpetrators. The government is still using financial institutions primarily to assist in investigating known or suspected terror financiers, not in identifying unknown ones. In addition, our government does not currently have the appropriate resources to process and make full use of information that is flowing to it from financial institutions.

I recognize that the information that would enable financial institutions to become effective partners with the U.S. government in identifying terror financing may be highly protected intelligence information. In other industries such as defense and transportation, however, persons can be designated by the U.S. government to receive access to certain high value information as necessary. A similar approach could be used to facilitate information sharing and cooperation between the U.S. government and private financial institutions.

Eighth, the National Security Council (NSC) and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should conduct a cross-cutting analysis of the budgets of all U.S. government agencies as they relate to terrorist financing. Monitoring the financial and human resources that are actually devoted to the various tasks involved in combating terrorist financing will facilitate fully informed, strategic decisions about whether resource allocations are optimal or functions are duplicative. For this reason, the NSC and OMB should conduct a cross-cutting analysis of all agencies' budgets in this area, to gain clarity about who is doing what, how well, and with what resources. With such a cross-cut in hand, the Administration and Congress can begin to assess the efficiency of existing efforts and the adequacy of appropriations relative to the threat.

Ninth, the U.S. government and private foundations, universities, and think tanks should increase efforts to understand the strategic threat posed to the United States by radical Islamic militancy, including specifically the methods and modalities of its financing and global propagation. At the dawn of the Cold War, the U.S. government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations committed substantial public and philanthropic resources to endow Soviet studies programs across the United States. The purpose of these efforts was to increase the level of understanding in this country of the profound strategic threat posed to the United States by Soviet Communism. A similar undertaking is now needed to understand adequately the threat posed to the United States by radical Islamic militancy, along with its causes, which we believe constitutes the greatest strategic threat to the United States at the dawn of this new century. To be commensurate with the threat, much more will need to be done by private U.S. foundations, universities, and think tanks in a sustained, deliberate, and well-financed manner.

I look forward to your questions.

STATEMENT OF MALLORY FACTOR, SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, "AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EFFORTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM FINANCING," JUNE 15, 2004

Madame Chairman, Senator Lieberman and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

I am honored to testify here today to report to you on the recommendations of the Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations on Terrorist Financing, of which I have served as Vice-Chair.

Madame Chairman and Senator Lieberman, I would like to commend you for your unwavering commitment to these issues. The work this Committee is undertaking is of critical importance to the United States and the world. Thank you for your important leadership.

Until relatively recently, too little was done to curb the flow of funds to terrorists and extremists. That is why the Council on Foreign Relations sponsored this Task Force in 2002 and renewed its mandate more recently. I would like to thank Council President Richard Haass for all that he has done to make this Task Force a success.

Our distinguished bi-partisan Task Force is chaired by Maurice R. Greenberg and directed by William F. Wechsler and Lee S. Wolosky. They led this Task Force in the interest of serving our nation. I believe they have succeeded.

I would particularly like to commend Lee Wolosky, without whose leadership, judgment, diplomacy, draftsmanship and dedicated efforts this task force would not have been a success. Lee worked tirelessly to reach consensus among task force members on the report and its recommendations.

The Bush administration has accomplished a great deal since 9/11. Some of the administration's achievements in this area have been integrating terrorist financing into the U.S. government's overall counterterrorism effort, securing unprecedented international support for UN sanctions against al-Qaeda, strengthening international standards for financial supervision through FATF, issuing significant and meaningful regulations under the PATRIOT Act and implementing a wide-ranging strategy to engage Saudi Arabia on the subject of financial and ideological support of extremists. Still, there is much work to be done and I believe that the Task Force report sets forth a framework of constructive, forward looking recommendations for improving U.S. efforts against terrorism financing.

Our report focuses on terror financing from within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia because of the enormous resources emanating from that state that fund terrorist activities. Clearly, there are numerous other states that finance terror and that should be examined also.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has accomplished a great deal since May 2003. Most notably, Saudi Arabia has enacted extensive laws and regulations which, if fully implemented, would significantly reduce the flow of funds from within Saudi Arabia to terrorists. However, we have not found Saudi Arabia to be effectively enforcing these laws and regulations as Lee Wolosky has discussed. Many issues still need to be addressed before Saudi Arabia will have an acceptable regime in place to combat terror financing.

Our task force report generally reaffirms the recommendations made in the Task Force's first report and makes nine new recommendations. I will discuss them in varying levels of detail and would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of them in greater length in response to your questions.

First, we urge U.S. policymakers to build a new framework for U.S.-Saudi relations. We recognize the broader context of the complex and important bilateral relationship in which the terrorist financing issue is situated. For decades, U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations have been built upon a consistent framework understood by both sides: Saudi Arabia would be a constructive actor with regard to the world's oil markets and re-

gional security issues, and the United States would help provide for the defense of Saudi Arabia, work to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and not raise any significant questions about Saudi Arabian domestic issues, either publicly or privately.

More recently however, this framework has come under strain because al-Qaeda, a terrorist organization rooted in issues central to Saudi Arabian domestic affairs, has murdered thousands of Americans. Al-Qaeda and similar organizations continue to conspire to kill even more Americans and to threaten our way of life.

Changed circumstances require a new policy framework for U.S.-Saudi relations. When domestic Saudi problems threaten Americans at home and abroad, the U.S. must pay attention to those Saudi "domestic" issues that impact U.S. security such as terrorist financing and the global export of Islamic extremism. These issues can no longer be "off the table"; they must be front and center in our bilateral relationship.

We acknowledge that this transition is already well underway, as evidenced by the turbulence in the bilateral relationship since 9/11. We note that some Bush administration officials have privately characterized the current state of affairs in Saudi Arabia as a "civil war" and suggested that the appropriate objective for U.S. policy in this context is to help the current regime prevail. We agree, but we believe the domestic Saudi problem will not be solved by dispersing al-Qaeda cells and members in Saudi Arabia alone. Rather, the "civil war" will be won only when the regime confronts directly and unequivocally addresses the ideological, religious, social, and cultural realities that fuel al-Qaeda, its imitators, and its financiers all over the world.

Second, we recommend that Saudi Arabia fully implement its new laws and regulations and take additional steps to further improve its efforts to combat terrorist financing. In addition to implementing its recently enacted laws and regulations in this area, Saudi Arabia should also deter the financing of terrorism by publicly punishing those Saudi individuals and organizations that have funded terrorist organizations. It should increase the financial transparency and programmatic verification of its global charities and publicly release audit reports of those charities. Saudi Arabia should also ratify and implement treaties that create binding international legal obligations relating to combating money laundering and terrorist financing.

Third, we suggest that multilateral initiatives be better coordinated, appropriately funded, and invested with clear punitive authorities. The need for a new international organization specializing in terrorist financing issues, as recommended by our initial report, has diminished as a result of significant efforts being undertaken by a variety of international actors. The need for proper coordination and clearer mandates has increased for the same reason. It is now time to minimize duplicative efforts and reallocate resources to the most effective and appropriate lead organization.

Fourth, we believe that the executive branch should formalize its efforts to centralize the coordination of U.S. measures to combat terrorist financing. Our understanding is that, in practice, responsibilities for the coordination of terrorist financing issues have shifted from the Treasury Department to the White House, as we recommended in our original Task Force report. I commend the Bush Administration for this action. However, we believe that this allocation of responsibility to the White House needs to be formalized through a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) or otherwise.

Fifth, we recommend that Congress enact a Treasury-led certification regime specifically on terrorist financing. The financial support for terrorism is the life-blood of global terrorism and requires its own certification regime. A separate certification process will ensure that stringent requirements are maintained specifically with respect to a nation's policies and practices on terrorist financing without consideration of other issues.

I believe that the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2003, S. 1888, sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter and co-sponsored by Chairman Collins and others would provide a good starting point for a terrorist financing certification regime if it were narrowed to focus solely on the financing of terrorism and expanded to apply to other nations.

We understand that certification regimes are generally disfavored by the executive branch (which must implement them) and favored by the legislative branch (which they empower). Although controversial, they also have the ability to galvanize quickly action consistent with U.S. interests. Moreover, they require official findings of fact that have the effect of promoting transparency and compelling sustained U.S. attention to important topics that, on occasion, U.S. officials find it more expedient to avoid.

For these reasons, we believe that Congress should pass and the President should sign legislation requiring the executive branch to submit to Congress on an annual basis a written certification (classified if necessary) detailing the steps that foreign nations have taken to cooperate in U.S. and international efforts to combat terrorist financing. We suggest that in the absence of a presidential national security waiver, states that do not receive this certification would be subject to sanctions—including denial of U.S. foreign assistance monies and limitations on access to the U.S. financial system.

Sixth, we urge the U.N. Security Council to broaden the scope of the U.N.'s al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. The UN Security Council should specifically impose international sanctions on other groups and individuals that have been designated as terrorists, as Hamas has been by the United States and E.U. Furthermore, it should require, as a matter of international law, that member states take enforcement action against groups, persons and entities designated by the Sanctions Committee. The enabling resolution for these expanded authorities should explicitly reject the notion that acts of terror may be legitimized by the charitable activities or political motivations of the perpetrator. No cause, however legitimate, justifies the use of terror; indeed, the use of terror delegitimizes even the most worthy causes.

Seventh, we suggest that the U.S. government increase sharing of information with the financial services sector as permitted by Section 314 of the USA PATRIOT ACT so that this sector can cooperate more effectively with the U.S. government in identifying incidences of terror financing. International financial institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are among our best sources of raw financial intelligence to identify terror financing, but these institutions need to be given appropriate information from the U.S. government on what to look for. Currently, the procedures required by Section 314 of the Patriot Act which are designed to promote cooperation with financial institutions in identifying terror financing are not working as effectively as they might. We suggest greater information sharing between the U.S. government and the financial institutions within the framework of the Patriot Act in order to allow these institutions to cooperate more effectively with the U.S.

government in identifying incidences of terror financing.

Eighth, we recommend that the National Security Council (NSC) and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) conduct a cross-cutting analysis of the budgets of all U.S. government agencies as they relate to terrorist financing. We understand this recommendation is difficult to implement; however, we think that monitoring the financial and human resources that are actually devoted to the various tasks involved in combating terrorist financing will facilitate fully informed, strategic decisions about whether resource allocations are optimal or functions are duplicative. For this reason, the NSC and OMB should conduct a cross-cutting analysis of all agencies' budgets in this area, to gain clarity about who is doing what, how well, and with what resources. Only with such a cross-cut in hand can we begin to make assessments regarding the efficiency of our existing efforts and the adequacy of appropriations relative to the threat. We commend Jody Myers, the former NSC staffer, for suggesting a similar cross-cutting analysis in his Senate testimony given last month.

Ninth, we urge the U.S. government and private foundations, universities, and think tanks to increase efforts to understand the strategic threat posed to the United States by radical Islamic militancy, including specifically the methods and modalities of its financing and global propagation. At the dawn of the Cold War, the U.S. government and U.S. nongovernmental organizations committed substantial public and philanthropic resources to endow Soviet studies programs across the United States. The purpose of these efforts was to increase the level of understanding in this country of the profound strategic threat posed to the United States by Soviet Communism. A similar undertaking is now needed to understand adequately the threat posed to the United States by radical Islamic militancy, along with its causes, which we believe constitutes the greatest strategic threat to the United States at the dawn of this new century. To be commensurate with the threat, much more will need to be done, not only in Washington, but also by private U.S. foundations, universities, and think tanks, in a more sustained, deliberate, and well-financed manner than that afforded through ad hoc initiatives such as our Task Force.

I look forward to your questions.

TRIBUTE TO COLIN HAUCK

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, today I rise to thank Colin Hauck, an intern in my Washington, DC, office, for all of the hard work he has done for me, my staff, and the State of South Dakota this fall.

Colin is a graduate of Aberdeen Central High School in Aberdeen, SD, and after graduating from the University of Arizona with a bachelor of arts in Anthropology, Colin received a master of arts in international relations and diplomacy at Leiden University in the Netherlands. He is a hard worker and has been dedicated to getting the most out of his internship experience.

I would like to rise and give my thanks to Colin and wish him continued success in the years to come.

TRIBUTE TO ERIC RODAWIG

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, today I rise to thank Eric Rodawig, an intern

in my Washington, DC, office, for all of the hard work he has done for me, my staff, and the State of South Dakota over the years.

Eric is a graduate of Dakota Valley High School in Dakota Dunes, SD, where he was the Valedictorian. Currently he is attending Georgetown University where he is majoring in government and economics and is active in writing for the school newspaper, *The Hoya*. He is a hard worker and has been dedicated to getting the most out of his internship experience.

I would like to rise and give my thanks to Eric and wish him continued success in the years to come.

RECOGNIZING TONY ANCELJ

Mr. THUNE. Mr. President, today I rise to thank Tony Ancelj, an intern in my Washington, DC, office, for all of the hard work he has done for me, my staff, and the State of South Dakota this fall.

Tony is a graduate of Saint Mary's College of California where he received a bachelor of arts in philosophy and political science. After attending the London School of Economics and Political Science in the United Kingdom, Tony was accepted at Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. He is a hard worker and has been dedicated to getting the most out of his internship experience.

I would like to rise and give my thanks to Tony and wish him continued success in the years to come.

10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE USS CHEYENNE

Mr. ENZI. Mr. President, I rise today to honor SSN 773, the USS *Cheyenne*, for her 10 years of service in the U.S. Navy in defense of our freedom.

On July 6, 1992, the keel was laid for the USS *Cheyenne* in Newport News, VA. She was launched on April 16, 1995. On September 13, 1996, Mrs. Ann Simpson sponsored the USS *Cheyenne*. I am pleased to now occupy the seat of Ann's husband, Senator ALAN SIMPSON, in the U.S. Senate.

Since September 11, 2001, the USS *Cheyenne* has been engaged in important missions as part of the global war on terrorism. The USS *Cheyenne* earned the distinction of the first to strike when she was the first ship to launch Tomahawk missiles in Operation Iraqi Freedom under the command of CDR Charles Doty. She would go on to successfully launch her entire complement of Tomahawks, earning a clean sweep for combat actions in the final 3 months of her 9 month deployment. That level of excellence continues today from her homeport in Pearl Harbor, HI.

The USS *Cheyenne* is the last Los Angeles class submarine built and the third ship in our Nation's fleet named in honor of the city home to Wyoming's State capital. The first USS *Cheyenne*, a tug boat, entered service in